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Philosopher and literary theorist, Jacques Rancière, has argued that Marcel 
Proust’s work as a novelist enables us to understand how modern literature 
articulates and largely resolves a specifically aesthetic crisis. From Rancière’s 
standpoint, Proust shows us how the dominant conflict in nineteenth-century 
French literature was carried beyond a mere opposition and given a new aesthetic 
significance in the modern novel. In this paper, I will discuss Jacques Rancière’s 
attempt to assess Proust’s contribution to literature in the wake of the aesthetic 
tradition epitomized by Kant and Schiller. Crucial to this attempt is the 
deployment of aesthetics as a historical discourse that introduces the possibility 
of variation in relation to the real. More specifically, I will examine Rancière’s 
argument that metaphor in Proust’s work has the capacity to transform a sense 
of doubleness into a new understanding of the real. Metaphor, according to 
Rancière, allows Proust to distance us from the real, that it to say, to produce 
fictive language, and then to employ form in a manner that introduces a new 
sense of the world through the vehicle of literature. Proust’s achievement in this 
regard becomes a successful attempt to resolve one of the founding oppositions 
that strucures modern aesthetics. In my conclusion, I will argue that Proust 
employs a concept of textuality that was perhaps first uncovered by Walter 
Benjamin and more recently developed by Julia Kristeva, whose readings of the 
same writer surpass a limited appropriation of Kant’s thought.  
The boundaries between art and life are unstable, thus allowing literature to 
assume a vitality that refutes the strong opposition between the fictive and the 
real. This inherent flexibility allows us to imagine how specific texts are uniquely 
inserted into literary history. For Rancière, Proust is exemplary in showing us 





that fiction presupposes and transforms. Proust’s originality in his argument can 
be traced back to a breakthrough that is not unrelated to this author’s reading of 
Arabian Nights. Hence, if impression is the talisman that opens the cave of material, 
architecture is the word that allows the writer to produce literary works that are 
formally unified.1 But the literary work of art is not constricted in a domain that 
simply dispenses with the sensibility. The impression derives from a singularity 
that is non-referential; it does not communicate a message but bespeaks the 
unthinkable coalescence of a peculiar shock and the duality of metaphor. 
The Proustian impression is both a sudden and unpredictable response to 
lived experience and a formation of new meaning. In emphasizing this 
doubleness at the level of the impression, Rancière shows us that Proust’s 
relationship to the past recalls both heterogeneity and the possibility of form that 
allows the literary work to acquire intelligibility through reading and 
interpretation:    
 
The impression is double not only because it is felt in two temporalities at once; it is 
double because it is both the shock that disorients, breaks the boundaries of the world, 
and brings forth primordial chaos, creates meaning, establishes correspondences, and 
determines vocations. Dionysos’s realm is that of Apollo and Hermes.2  
 
When conceived in this manner, doubleness in Proust does not exclude 
shock but must be distinguished from what Baudelaire experienced and, 
according to Benjamin, enabled him to write a new kind of poetry. Benjamin had 
contended earlier that the two authors are in fact quite different, noting that 
Proust refashioned Bergsonian memory for artistic ends: “Proust immediately 
confronts this involuntary memory with a voluntary memory, one that is in the 
service of the intellect.”3 For Baudelaire, in contrast, the shock experience was 
                                                          
1 Jacques Rancière, Mute Speech ((New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 156.                                  
2 Ibid. p. 157. 





not only primary but was intended to be read historically, thus introducing a 
mode of time that Proust does not usually evoke.4     
 Rancière describes how Proust combines sensation and language in a 
metaphorical leap into aesthetic plurality in contrast to the historical distance that 
Baudelaire’s poetry so often exemplifies. This metaphorical leap is not 
metaphysical in the old sense because it involves primordial contact with 
sensations that suddenly decenter us when we come closest to what is proximate. 
Metaphor is what springs into being when the shock experience disrupts the 
patterns of everyday life: 
 
It is metaphor alone that unfolds and makes manifold the one of pure sensation that 
punctuates the concatenations of habits and beliefs. Metaphor, as a power of both order 
and disorder, is charged with a twofold labor. It brings together distant objects and 
makes their coming-together speak. But metaphor also undoes the laws of 
representation. It is metaphor that inverts the earth and sun in Elstir’s canvas, in 
conformity with the truth of vision that is also the truth of its allusion.5   
 
Metaphor suggests how Proust attempts to undo the initial shock that 
temporarily destroys the narrator’s relation to objects and to resist the tendency 
to stabilize the literary work through verbal representation. Unlike what classical 
rhetoric codifies as adequate to its own canon, metaphor in modern literature 
suggests that life and art communicate—but only through their difference.6  
This reconfiguration of the relationship between art and life is not to be 
observed within the framework of the literary work alone. Rancière also helps us 
envision this configuration through Proust’s contribution to literary history, 
which can be read as a successful effort to resolve an aesthetic conflict. Proust is 
able to produce a literature that moves beyond the two-fold impasse that 
emerges in “the Flaubertian frivolity of subject that drags form down to its 
insignificance and the Mallarméan essentiality that leads to the paralysis of 
                                                          
4 Ibid., p. 162, 
5 Jacques Rancière, op. cit., p. 159. 





writing.”7 Gustave Flaubert’s contribution to the prose tradition shows us how 
the goal of verbal transparency culminates in an irrevocable plunge into material 
life. For Rancière, this plunge can be related to the project of abolishing art in 
time, which ought to coincide with the productive transposition of art into life 
and the abandonment of aesthetics through its fulfillment. However, instead of 
achieving this goal, Ranciere suggests that Flaubert fails to move beyond a mere 
negation of aesthetics, while he abandons life to an immersion in material 
content. This failure is demonstrated in both L’Education sentimental and Madame 
Bovary, two novels in which major characters demonstrate how blind ambition 
prevents aesthetic distance from fusing personal experience with self-
understanding. In contrast, Stéphane Mallarmé produces tightly structured 
poems, such as the early “Hérodiade” and “L’après-midi d’un faune” as well as 
the magisterial “Plusiers sonnets,” inaugurating a style of formal writing that 
forsakes mundane experience, while alluding to a realm of pure essences that 
cannot be retrieved.8 And yet, while envisioning poetry as a dramatic spectacle 
through which the body politic acquires utopian features, Mallarmé also fails to 
indicate how art can be translated into a redemption of everyday life.    
Rancière cogently argues that the novels of Proust uniquely express the 
aesthetic contradiction that Friedrich Schiller first articulated in his seminal text, 
Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menchen (1795). Schiller identifies this 
contradiction in terms of two drives, namely, the sensuous drive and the drive for 
form, which call attention to the difference between material existence and moral 
reason.9 In Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant had proposed only five years earlier that 
aesthetics performs the role of bridge between nature and freedom.10 The 
disciplinary meaning of this opposition, however, derives from the dissimilar 
spheres of science and ethics and requires a mediatory sphere to mitigate an 
                                                          
7 Ibid., p. 156. 
8 See Stéphane Mallarmé, “Hérodiade,” “L’Après-midi d’un faune,” “Plusiers sonnets,” Oeuvres complètes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1998), pp. 17-22, 22-25, 36-46. 
9 Friedrich Schiller, “Twelfth Letter,” The Aesthetic Education of Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 
pp. 78-83. 





undue harshness and to prevent the sensibility from becoming superfluous. 
Schiller, however, defines aesthetics as the sphere of freedom and does not 
require that it be grounded in politics, even while he argues that it may have 
political significance. At the same time, Schiller requires a third term, namely, the 
play impulse, to negotiate the conflict between heteronomy and formal rigor.11 
This third drive produces a sphere of activity that enables aesthetics to constitute 
human nature and to contribute, if only indirectly, to man’s political future. The 
elaboration of what this entails is fundamental and prevents us from identifying 
Schiller—who is correctly read as developing the legacy of Kant—as a mere 
epigone when in truth his originality largely consists in restoring political content 
to aesthetic theory. In short, Schiller provides a political dimension to a 
philosophical debate that was arguably political in its longer history, if Kant’s 
predecessors are read as continuing the classical conception of art that descends 
from Plato and is revitalized by Shafesbury and Burke.12 Without politicizing 
aesthetics in a direct way, Schiller extends the possibility of critique to include 
politics as it functions in a world that sustains the contradiction between nature 
and freedom. In such a situation, any possible redistribution of the sensible 
would assume an aesthetic meaning, just as it entails a critical relationship to 
political institutions. 
 We might pause for a moment and place Schiller’s aesthetic project in the 
historical context to which it responds as a theoretical challenge. Kant argues that 
the judgment of the beautiful is disinterested because the subject’s relation to the 
aesthetic object is not based on “the power of form over matter, or intelligence 
over sensibility.”13 In the wake of the French Revolution, Schiller formalizes the 
                                                          
11 Friedrich Schiller, “Fourteenth Letter,” op. cit., pp. 95-99. 
12 Gadamer contends that Kant contributes to the long tradition of aesthetics that was originally 
political and is only later “subjectivized” in transcendental philosophy. For details, see Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1991), pp. 42-81. Gadamer’s argument, 
of course, does not require that we see aesthetics as politics but that it is related to a past history that 
was originally in tune with political experience and might be revisited within this framework, assuming 
that aesthetics can be interpreted in a hermeneutical context.                
13 Jacques Rancière, “Aesthetics and Politics” in Aesthetics and its Discontents (Cambridge and New York: 





political meaning of disinterested play as a freedom from domination that 
prefigures a new sort of community. For Rancière, Schiller’s appropriation of 
“free play” presupposes a suspension of interests that normally oppose active 
engagement to passive reception. Rancière uses the example of the Juno Ludovisi 
as evoked in Schiller’s aesthetic treatise to mark the difference between the 
regime of representation and the regime of art:     
 
The statue is a ‘free appearance’. It stands thus in a twofold contrast to its representative 
status: it is not an appearance drawn from reality that would serve as its model. Nor is it 
an active form imposed on matter. As a sensory form, it is heterogeneous to the ordinary 
forms of sensory experience that these dualities inform.14 
 
The will of the sculptor in this example is suspended in the contemplation 
of the goddess whose perfection is inseparable from non-appearance. And yet, 
conscious inactivity is not simply a refusal of politics but a style of announcing a 
way of life that would not be founded on an earlier antagonism  
The regime of art might be defined in phenomenological terms as a 
suspension of the natural attitude that is commonly used to justify both a naïve 
approach to the object world and a more ideological defense of political 
inequality. This suspension underlies the inherently literary nature of fiction, 
which becomes thematic whenever the text calls attention to the trait of having 
been constructed. But suspension is not primarily a contemplative achievement. 
In this regard, perhaps Hegel is just as useful as Husserl as a guide for reading 
Schiller as an aesthetic theorist. What is generally called dialectics no doubt 
received an initial impetus from Schiller’s description of aesthetic play, which 
implies both negation and preservation (Aufhebung) in the formation of a higher 
unity.15 This description has the advantage of allowing us to better understand 
how aesthetics elevates art over life through a process of transformation, rather 
than through a mere withdrawal from practice.   
                                                          
14 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 





However, while the avant-gardes have typically sought to fulfill the promise 
of aesthetics by closing the gap between art and life, Marcel Proust in À recherche 
du temps perdu can be shown to narrate the difference between art and life and to 
stage their possible reunion. Rancière argues that Proust balances the unstable 
opposition between art and life in form and content, thus producing an image of 
the aesthetic that testifies to the singularity of a writer who captured the 
significance of time in a redistribution of the sensible. In approaching this 
contradiction, Proust is exemplary in demonstrating how the oscillation between 
opposed principles lends coherence to the work of literature that invites us to 
read in view of a dual task. The two “ways” that are identified in the first and 
concluding books of Proust’s great narrative encode opposed aesthetic options 
that remain operative throughout this text and indicate how life as lived is not 
incompatible with the transcendental thrust of the literary imagination. Joshua 
Landry has discussed how Marcel, the narrator, invariably perceives “worlds, that 
is to say systems that are both homogeneous and heterogeneous, alien to 
everyday experience and at the same time perfectly coherent from within.”16     
Hence, in Du Côté de chez Swann, if “Méséglise way” leads to a flat plain 
where the possibility of love is intermingled with the signs of natural growth, 
“Guermantes way” evokes a medieval past through water-lilies and the steeple of 
Saint-Hilaire.17 But this opposition is not contrived; it expresses two desires at the 
same time: first, it shows how quotidian reality is always already shot through 
with a sense of what surpasses and comes to us in material form; second, it 
shows how this same spiritual intimation introduces a tension with everyday life 
in various forms that escape the present. Proust in these passages echoes his early 
study of John Ruskin, but the perspectives of Marcel differ from those of Proust 
in the same way that a memoir differs from a unified work of art.18 Moreover, in 
                                                          
16 Joshua Landry, Philosophy as Fiction: Self, Deception and Knowledge in Proust (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 66. 
17 The possible conjunction of the two ways, as well as their ability to merge conscious and unconscious 
motivations, is announced in Marcel Proust, Du Côté de chez Swann, A la recherche du temps perdu (Paris: 
Éditions Gallimard, 1992), pp. 175-79. 





Le Temps retrouvé, the reader is ultimately encouraged to link back to Combray 
upon learning that both the social poseur, Madame Verdurin, and Swann’s 
daughter, Gilberte, have married into the Guermantes’s family.19 The 
interpenetration of aesthetics and a world that is in touch with sensory 
experience is crucial to the construction of the Proustian text, just as it is basic to 
how key documents in the aesthetic tradition invite us to break with rigid 
dichotomies.20 For Rancière, the double hermeneutic animating Proust’s work 
provides a moving image of a discourse that has not been exhausted any more 
than it has been fully understood. 
Walter Benjamin’s reading of Proust can be read as complementary to 
Rancière’s attempt to discover an aesthetic mid-point between Flaubert’s realism 
and Mallarmé’s hermeticism. Benjamin goes so far as to claim that Proust’s 
writing is the counterpart to Penelope’s weaving, rather than its mere likeness.21 
In elaborating this contention, Benjamin cites Proust’s habit later in life of 
turning his days into periods of darkness in order to produce an increasingly 
accurate record of what is usually only revealed to us in our dreams. The role of 
memory is therefore crucial and surpasses the role of author and plot as the 
essential component in creativity.22 Memory, however, is not to be confused with 
a contemplative gathering together of what extends into the past and has finally 
come to light. Proust’s view of things is a textual web that allows intellect and 
sensibility to interpenetrate in a manner that implicitly relates our eagerness to 
restrict them to discrete domains for the purpose of clearly distinguishing them. 
At the same time, Proust’s strategy can be read as an attempt to reduce the gap 
                                                          
19 In the midst of a somewhat macabre scene of reunion, the Narrator brings together Combray and the 
world of the Guermantes in referring to these significant, if not always happy, marriages. See Marcel 
Proust, Le Temps retrouvé, op. cit., pp. 314-16. 
20 Deleuze emphasizes how Proust evokes a “plurality of worlds” in which verbal signs can be 
interpreted, even when their appearance is not always unitary. See Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs (New 
York: George Braziller, 1972), p. 5. However, Deleuze’s semiotic reading of Proust would differ 
considerably from Rancière’s aesthetic reading and should be distinguished from it.     
21 Walter Benjamin, op. cit., 202. 





between art and life in a manner that in some respects looks forward to the 
practices of the surrealists.      
 More recently, Julia Kristeva has deepened Benjamin’s response to Proust’s 
work as a novelist whose use of language expresses a belief in the imaginary. For 
Kristeva, language in Proust implies a unique mode of temporality: “Time 
regained would then be the time of language as an imaginary experience. What is 
perceived and what is said are separated by a distance, an incompatibility, an 
inadequacy that somehow brings them together”23 Like Rancière, Kristeva also 
emphasizes how Proust’s use of signs is firmly grounded in a sense of 
doubleness; hence, “sensation and idea” constitutes “a represented perception of 
an embodied image.”24 Noting Proust’s indebtedness to major figures in the 
history of aesthetics, Kristeva also emphasizes how the French writer “rejects 
psychology precisely because it is restricted to the subjective,” while the notion 
of ‘involuntary memory’ combines with time to mark a more original sense of the 
psyche.25 .      
The reflections on textuality that animate both Benjamin and Kristeva point 
to Rancière’s approach to Proust, which is informed by an awareness of how the 
“aesthetic unconscious” performs a crucial role in enabling the French author to 
compose a complete work of art. For Rancière, the aesthetic unconscious in 
contrast to the unconscious of psychoanalysis does not point to a process that 
exceeds consciousness but integrates the effects of the unconscious into the 
literary work. Proust’s work presents the self as both reflective and open-ended, 
just as it provides an aesthetic basis for recovering unity through the mode of 
contemplation as opposed to discursive reasoning. What this means is that unity 
is achieved only intermittently through aesthetic experience, rather than as the 
telos of a long-range goal. Hence, the work of art provides the preeminent 
occasion for a sense of identity that can carry us beyond the experience of the 
individual self. From this standpoint, Schelling’s remarks on art during the Age of 
                                                          
23 Julia Kristeva, Time and Sense: Proust and the Experience of Literature (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996), p. 204. 
24 Ibid., p. 210. 





Idealism acquire a special significance, especially when read in the light of 
Proust’s literary achievement: “The work of art merely reflects to me what is 
otherwise not reflected by anything, namely, that absolutely identical which has 
already divided itself even in the self.” Finally, and as a consequence, what is 
divided even in consciousness “comes, through the miracle of art, to be radiated 
back from the products thereof.”26 
In conclusion, we might consider how Rancière employs the example of 
Proust’s novels to argue that aesthetics in its crucial modern phase has always 
implicitly, if not explicitly, depended on a contrast between art and life as well as 
on their practical connection. Art invariably requires an internal awareness of the 
difference between life and presentation, which places metaphor in the 
foreground of literary expression. Literature is also a specific art that 
demonstrates how mundane experience and a movement beyond everyday life 
are intertwined in carefully constructed texts that blend conscious and 
unconscious motivations. The “doubling” that can be discerned in literary texts, 
particularly in the Proustian narrative, maps onto the aesthetic predicament that 
has defined our culture, at least since the late eighteenth century, when a new 
response to life was required to offset a stark opposition that was dramatized in a 
widely experienced political failure. This new response to life as inseparable from 
the contribution of literature, which sustains the possibility of some future unity, 
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